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DECEPTION: PAST EXPERIENCES--FUTURE OPPORTUNITIES

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College
in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Joint
Military Operations Department.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views
and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the
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The importance of deception in warfare has been recognized at least since the fourth century B.C. when Sun Tzu wrote about the merits of deception in warfare and suggested its capabilities as a force multiplier. This paper addresses the successful use of deception in past operations and its relevance for future operations. It presents an analysis of three successful deception operations--Fortitude, the Yom Kippur War and Desert Storm. The analysis includes a description and comparision of the three cases plus conclusions on why they were successful. Using these conclusions, the paper develops several lessons learned for operational commanders for use in future deception operations. Finally, it examines the relevance of deception in today's world characterized by high technology and contingencies that range across the spectrum of conflict.

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DECEPTION: PAST EXPERIENCES--FUTURE OPPORTUNITIES

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Communism had a great wall; Communism stumbled and with the wall did fall.
All Gorby's efforts and those of the coups plotter men could not put Communism
back together again.

The Berlin Wall came tumbling down, the Cold War ended, and
the Soviet Union collapsed. The death knell for Communism had
tolled. Peace had broken out all over and the world was a much
safer less complicated place. The U.S. military was now
expendable and its dismantling offered an unlimitless peace
dividend to solve all America's domestic ills. So the cover
story went for one of the most successful deception operations
in U.S. history--rivaled only by similar ones after World Wars I
and II that resulted in massive downsizing of U.S. forces.
American had been deceived again not by the enemy but by
herself. Unfortunately much of the rest of the world--Somalia,
Bosnia, Serbia, Iraq, Iran--was not deceived and found the use
of force and military buildup quite acceptable for addressing
their ambitions and security needs.

But lest you, too, be deceived, this paper is not about how
America has deceived herself into a false sense of security but
rather how the operational commander can best operate in the
realities of the new world order. The reality for the
operational commander is not that the world has become a less

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complicated, more peaceful place but that his missions have expanded and diversified while his resources have dwindled. The challenge for the operational commander is to find tools that can act as force multipliers to help him maximize his resources. It is here that deception can be used as an advantage rather than a disadvantage.

Military commanders throughout history have used various means of deception to intentionally misrepresent reality to their adversaries to gain a competitive advantage. As early as the Fourth Century B.C., Sun Tzu understood the relevance of deception to warfare when he wrote: "All warfare is based on deception."[1] He also understood the potential of deception as a force multiplier. He said:

> If I am able to determine the enemy's dispositions
> while at the same time I conceal my own then I can
> concentrate and he must divide. And if I
> concentrate while he divides, I can use my entire
> strength to attack a fraction of his. There I will
> be numerically superior.[2]

The dispositions, Sun Tzu refers to, include intentions, capabilities, or perceptions. The deceiver by hiding or misleading the enemy about his own dispositions can influence the enemy's intentions, perceptions, or capabilities so that he acts in a way that is advantageous to the deceiver.

Prior to World War I, deception took place mostly at the tactical level where feints, decoys, and camouflage were used to deceive the adversary. By World War I, communications (radio) and surveillance (air reconnaissance) technology had increased greatly expanding the number of information channels available

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to both collect information about the enemy and to disseminate both information and disinformation to him.[3] Ruses, exercises and demonstrations could now be carried out to achieve strategic as well as tactical deception. The art of operational deception was now possible and began to be practiced more frequently and with increasing success.[4]

How can the operational commander of today, best use deception to gain an advantage over the enemy? Are their certain criteria or recurring themes that apply to all deception operations? To answer these questions, this paper will first examine three successful deception operations--Operation *Fortitude* in World War II, the Yom Kippur War and Desert Storm. This examination will include a description and comparison of the three examples as well as some conclusions as to how and why the operations were successful. Using these conclusions, the paper will present several lessons learned for the operational commander in conducting future deception operations. Lastly, it will address the possibilities and limitations for using deception in future conflicts.

CHAPTER II

EXAMINATION OF SELECTED DECEPTION OPERATIONS

Fortitude. The first operation to be examined is
Fortitude which was part of Operation BODYGUARD, the overall
deception operation used to support Operation OVERLORD, the
cross channel invasion of France in World War II. Operation
BODYGUARD consisted of four major deception plans: (1)
Fortitude, to make the Germans believe there would be an
invasion of Norway and the Pas de Calais, (2) *Zeppelin*, to keep
German troops tied down in the Balkans and the eastern
Mediterranean prior to the Normandy invasion, (3) *Ironside*, to
keep German troops occupied in the Bordeaux area during the
first three weeks following the Normandy invasion, and (4)
Vendetta, to keep German troops in Southern France away from the
Normandy beaches prior to the invasion.[5]

Fortitude consisted of two parts *Fortitude North* and
Fortitude South. *Fortitude North* dealt with the fictitious
invasion of Norway. It's aim was to keep the Germans from
reinforcing the Normandy area and to convince them that the
cross channel invasion was planned for later than they
originally expected. The plan was carried out using several
forms of deception. A small group of radio operators simulated
radio transmissions of the fictitious British Fourth Army which
was to carry out the attack on Norway. Plans for the fictitious
invasions were leaked to controlled agents considered extremely

reliable by the Germans. References to the British Fourth Army and its subordinate units were made in BBC broadcasts and British newspapers.. Air Vice-Marshal Thornton who had been the pre-war Air Attache to Sweden was sent back to Sweden to discuss with a Swedish government official the Allied plans to invade Norway knowing that the discussions would be leaked to the German government. *Fortitude North* was a success as Germany kept over 200,000 troops in Norway awaiting an invasion that never happened.[6]

Fortitude South revolved around the fictitious invasion of Pas de Calais. Several types of deception were used to convince the Germans that Pas de Calais was the site for the main cross channel landing. Similar to *Fortitude North*, a fictitious unit, the First United States Army Group (FUSAG) to be commanded by General Patton, was created to carry out the fictitious landing. FUSAG consisted of a mix of fictional and real Canadian, British and American subordinate units. As the actual Normandy invasion drew near, the actual units were incrementally drawn off as they entered the actual order of battle and were replaced in the FUSAG order of battle with other fictitious units. By the time the Normandy invasion took place, FUSAG was made up of totally fictitious units. The actions of FUSAG were revealed to the enemy through controlled agents and simulated radio traffic. These radio transmissions continued after the actual Normandy landings to convince the Germans that Normandy was only a feint and that the main invasion, at Pas de Calais, was yet to come.

To compliment the FUSAG scheme, a dummy fuel installation was built to pump petroleum across the Dover Channel. Decoy tanks, guns and vehicles were placed in the woods, as if hidden, and plywood landing craft were placed along the eastern and southeastern coasts of England. A German Army General and prisoner of war in England, who was being released back to Germany due to illness, was taken through the actual Normandy staging area which he was told was FUSAG and where he met General Patton, the alleged FUSAG Commander. He had no idea where he actually was as all the street signs and village road names had been removed.[7] The beaches of Pas de Calais were bombed to suggest that an attack was imminent and deceptive lighting schemes, using hooded lamps and torches, were employed to simulate large troop concentrations and to divert bombing raids.[8] *Fortitude South* was so successful that Hitler did not allow troops to be moved from the Pas de Calais area until almost seven weeks after the Normandy invasion was launched.[9]

Why was *Fortitude* so successful? First, the mission of the deception operation was clearly understood from the beginning. The task was not to convince Hitler that an invasion would not take place but to deceive him of the actual time and place so that he would not divert troops to the Normandy area. The means of deception that were used were realistic, took advantage of Allied strengths (double agents) and German weaknesses (poor intelligence and Hitler's intransigence) and directly supported the mission. Second, Allies knew before hand when and where

Hitler thought they would attack. Hitler, even before the massive deception effort, believed that the cross channel invasion would take place at Pas de Calais for several reasons. Pas de Calais provided: the shortest sea crossing and shortest flight time from England, the shortest route to mainland Germany, a seaport, and assured destruction of the Vl, V2 and V3 sites in the area.[10] It was easy to feed Hitler's misperceptions, since they were based on rational facts, and to deceive the German military since Hitler alone called the shots and was not likely to be dissuaded by his subordinates who might provide him evidence that conflicted with his beliefs.

Third, the Allies had excellent intelligence. The British had complete control over their double agents who were considered highly reliable by the Germans and, through *Ultra,* had access to German communications at the highest levels. This provided immediate and reliable feedback on how the Germans were responding to the deception efforts. Fourth, the deception operation was approved and understood at the highest levels and had been developed along with OVERLORD from the very beginning. Although the deception operations were planned by the London Controlling Section, Churchill and the Commander, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces both had oversight of and approved the plans.[11]

Fifth, timing of the deception activities was carefully controlled and phased with the actual cross channel invasion to ensure operational realism and security. Sixth, operational

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security *for Fortitude* appears to have been maintained despite the involvement of <u>all</u> the Allies in the operation.[12]

The Yom Kippur War. The second case we will study is the 1973 War between Israel, Egypt and Syria. The Egyptians began planning the Yom Kippur War directly after the 1967 war with Israel. They studied the war carefully to determine both their and Israel's strengths and weaknesses. They took immediate steps to correct their weaknesses in equipment, training, and doctrine and paid careful attention to Israel's perceptions of their own intents and capabilities.

Unlike OVERLORD where the expected outcome was military defeat of the enemy, the Egyptians had very limited military goals and had no illusions that they could defeat the Israelis militarily. Sadat hoped to use the war to speed up the political resolution of the territory Egypt had lost in the '67 War and to increase his standing at home and in the rest of the Arab World. He believed that by using deception he could launch a surprise attack on Israel and by catching them off guard could seize enough territory and inflict enough casualties that the superpowers would be forced to step in and would resolve the conflict in Egypt's favor.[13]

In January 1973, Sadat convinced Syria to take part in the war. Once Syria agreed, Sadat along with Gen Ismail, the Egyptian Minister of War, and Major General Gamasy, the Commander in Chief of the Joint Military Command, began to put the final touches on the deception plan to support the surprise

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attack.[14] The main goal of the deception plan was to confuse Israeli and Western analysts as to why troops were concentrating along the canal and to convince Israel and the West that the Egyptians weren't willing or capable of fighting a war with Israel but preferred to pursue diplomatic solutions.[15] The deception had to be convincing enough and phased carefully enough with the actual attack to ensure that the Israelis would not be mobilized when the attack took place or launch a preemptive attack.

To do this, the Egyptians used several means of deception. From January to October 1973, when the attack actually took place, the Egyptians had three major and a score of other minor mobilizations. They hoped the continued mobilizations would serve two purposes: to dissuade the Israelis from responding in kind due to the high cost to mobilize and to convince them that mobilization was unnecessary since the Egyptian mobilizations were only an attempt by Sadat to counter internal dissent about his unwillingness to take a stronger stand against Israel. The Israelis responded in kind to the first mobilization which cost them over $10 million and caused internal dissent within the Israeli government over Egypt's true intentions and capabilities.[16] Israel's Military Intelligence convinced the government that further mobilizations were not necessary since Egypt was not capable (either politically or militarily) of launching an attack and that even if they did the Israelis would have at least 24-48 hours notice.[17]

The Egyptians knew that, due to their poor showing against Israel in the '67 War, the Israeli Defense Forces and Military Intelligence thought they were totally inept militarily. To foster this misperception, Egypt expelled Soviet military advisors and leaked stories to the press that they did not know how to adequately use Soviet supplied radar and missile sites. Similarly, the Syrians made public statements claiming to be dissatisfied with Soviet equipment and threatening to expel Soviet advisors. The Egyptians and Syrians also used diplomatic deception to convince Israel and the West that Egypt and Syria preferred to resolve their territorial disputes with Israel diplomatically. In late September, both Syria and Egypt initiated steps to meet with U.N. officials to present their cases against Israel.[18]

The Egyptians and Syrians further enhanced the deception by picking Yom Kippur as the date for the attack. Yom Kippur is the holiest of Jewish holidays and coincides with the Muslim holy month of Ramadan. The Egyptians hoped that the Israelis would be distracted by the religious holiday and therefore be less prepared to mobilize and that they would never guess that the attack would occur during the holy month.[19]

As the actual date of the attack drew near, Egypt used a military exercise to disguise her buildup along the canal. Troops, armor, and artillery moved in but munitions were conspicuously absent. The munitions had been moved to underground storage sites prior to the exercise. Bridging

equipment was brought in in unmarked crates and equipment that might tip off the impending attack was not brought in until the very last moment. Troops moved from the barracks to the canal during the day and back to the barracks at night. However, some troops using the cover of darkness did not return to the barracks but massed along the front. Soldiers were forbidden to wear helmets and 'lazy squads' were sent to the banks of the canal to fish and to foster an air of normalcy and unpreparedness.[20] No attempt was made to prepare the population for war or to activate civil defense agencies[21]

The deception worked. Israel was caught off guard and Egypt initially recaptured some of the territory she had lost in the '67 War. Israel ended up ultimately as the military victor, but Sadat was the political victor. The Soviet Union stepped in to ensure a cease fire and the U.S. negotiated a peace treaty between Eqypt and Israel which redressed most of Egypt's territorial claims.

Why was the deception operation in the Yom Kippur War so successful? It was successful for many of the same reasons *Fortitude* was successful. First, the Egyptians and Syrians understood the strategic mission and the role the deception operation was to play in meeting the mission. The goal of the deception was not to aid in a defeat of Israel but to keep Israel from mobilizing or launching a preemptive attack. Second, the Egyptians knew how Israel, particularly the Israeli Military Intelligence and Defense Forces, perceived them. They did not

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have to change these perceptions but only to reinforce them. Unlike in *Fortitude* where increasing the noise level and ambiguity was disadvantageous, in the Yom Kippur War, increasing the noise level was an intended effect of the deception operation. It fostered the dissent and indecision within the Israeli government making them less likely to mobilize or launch a preemptive strike against Egypt. Third, the Egyptians understood how the Israeli intelligence system worked. They knew it was monopolized by Israeli Military Intelligence who was completely convinced, despite all the evidence to the contrary, that Egypt could not launch a surprise attack.

Fourth, also like *Fortitude*, the detailed deception operation appears to have been prepared by the military but with oversight by the highest levels of government including Sadat himself and was planned along with the actual attack from the very beginning. Fifth, timing of the deception operation and the actual attack were critical in ensuring the Israelis did not mobilize or preempt the attack. Operations that would have tipped off the actual attack date were delayed to the last possible moment. Sixth, operational security was extraordinary. In a survey of 8,000 prisoners of war held by Israel after the war, 95 percent did not know until the morning of the attack that they were going to participate in an attack and not just an exercise.[22]

Desert Storm. The final deception operation to be examined took place in Desert Storm. Less is known about the actual

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planning and execution of this operation since much of the information is still classified. This examination will describe the deception operation as detailed in unclassified sources. The military mission in Desert Storm was to conduct offensive operations to: (1) neutralize Iraqi National Command Authority, (2) remove Iraqi troops from Kuwait, (3) destroy the Republican Guard, (4) destroy Iraqis nuclear, biological, chemical and ballistic missile capabilities as early as possible, and (5) aid in restoring the legitimate government of Kuwait.[23] The military operation was to consist of four phases: (1) the strategic air campaign, (2) achieving air supremacy in the Kuwaiti theater of operations, (3) battlefield preparation, and (4) the offensive ground campaign.[24] This analysis is concerned with the deception operation supporting the fourth phase, the ground campaign.

In mid-December when CINCCENT briefed the detailed operation plan to the SECDEF and CJCS, included in his operational imperatives was the basic goal for his deception operation: "use operational deception to fix or divert Republican Guard and other heavy units away from main effort."[25] The specific goal of the plan was to convince Iraq that the main attack would be made directly into Kuwait from Saudi Arabia and that it would be supported by an amphibious assault so that Saddam would concentrate his forces in eastern Kuwait and along the Kuwaiti coast and not divert any to the main assault area.[26]

The deception operation involved a mix of Coalition forces. To convince Iraq that an amphibious assault would take place, the Navy conducted feints and demonstrations in the Persian Gulf. The Marines staged amphibious landings as part of *Imminent Thunder* and the six *Sea Soldier* exercises.

To convince the Iraqis that the main ground assault would come from either the south or east of Kuwait, Coalition air forces flew combat air patrols along the coast and the Kuwaiti/Saudi Arabian border. They set up their air refueling tracks and training areas as if supporting a frontal assault against the Iraqis entrenched along the southern border.[27] The First Cavalry Division thirty days prior to the main assault staged feints, demonstrations and artillery raids into the Wadi Al-Batin area as if it was the main area of attack.

As troops were moved from the southern border to the west to support the main assault which was to come from the west (Schwarzkopf's much heralded Hail Mary play), small units were left behind to simulate actions of the larger units. Task Force Troy consisting of about 460 infantry, armor and reconnaissance personnel, engineers, Seabees, and Army PSYOPs troops, operating in the Al-Wafrah area, simulated the activity of a 16,000 man Marine unit which had actually moved west. They used simulated radio transmissions, dummy tanks and artillery guns, and loudspeakers blaring tank noises across the borders while helicopters landed to simulate troop reinforcement.[28]

To keep Iraqi troops fixed along the southern border and coast as the actual western assault began to unfold, the Amphibious Task Force moved into the Northern Gulf threatening a major amphibious assault, Coalition troops along the southern and eastern borders staged feints into Kuwait, and the Marines and Navy staged raids on Falakah, Al-Faw and Bubiyan Islands.[29]

The deception operation appears to have been a success. Saddam kept his troops along the southern and eastern borders and along the coast. The western assault caught the Iraqis off guard and unprepared. A map found in an Iraqi Command Center after the war showed that Saddam believed Falakah Island would be attacked.[30] Found in another former Iraqi command center in Kuwait City was a room sized model of Kuwait on which all the Iraqi forces were positioned to repel an amphibious assault.[31]

Why was the deception operation successful? First, as with Fortitude and the Yom Kippur War, the Desert Storm deception operation supported the overall mission. Unlike Yom Kippur, but like *Fortitude*, the deception effort was not to convince Saddam that a ground attack would not take place but to deceive him of the actual timing and location of the main attack so that he would not reinforce the main assault area. The deception tactics used met this goal. Second, as in *Fortitude* and the Yom Kippur War, the operational planners knew in advance what the enemy thought the Coalition forces intended and were capable of doing. Saddam believed from the beginning that an amphibious assault would take place. He also believed that the Coalition

could not launch an attack from the west due to the lack of roads and infrastructure in the desert and that Arab members of the Coalition would not agree to an attack through Iraqi soil for political reasons.[32] The deception operation was used to reinforce not change his beliefs.

Third, the Coalition forces had excellent intelligence while the Iraqi's were basically "blind." The air campaign had destroyed or neutralized most of the Iraqi air reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities as well as much of their command, control and communications capabilities. The Iraqis relied on CNN and other media, during much of the war, as their primary intelligence source. A fact that did not go unnoticed by CINCCENT who leaked false stories to the media about planned Coalition actions and intentions and gave daily press briefings filled with misleading information to enhance the deception operation. One example of how the media was used to support the deception is a Newsweek article that appeared two week priors to the ground assault and which provided great detail on the upcoming amphibious assault. The article opened with: "In one sense, our amphibious assault on Iraqi forces in Kuwait is already underway. It's just that the Iraqi's don't know it."[33]

Even when the media speculated that a western assault might take place, Saddam had no means of technical verification. When the CINCCENT met with Iraqi military officials after the war to draw up a separation line between Iraqi and Coalition troops in Iraq, the officials were completed surprised and shocked at how

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far the Coalition forces had advanced.[34]   While Iraq was "blind," the CINCCENT had a wealth of reconnaissance/ surveillance tools at his disposal to provide him excellent feedback on how the Iraqis were responding to the deception efforts and to allow him to modify the plan when required.

Fourth, similar to *Fortitude* and the Yom Kippur War, the Desert Storm deception operation was planned and executed by CINCCENT but appears to have been fully briefed to and approved by the President, SECDEF, and the CJCS as an integral part of the ground assault operation from its inception. Fifth, the deception operation was carefully phased with the actual assault to ensure that the deception was believable and that neither operation was compromised. Sixth, operational security appeared to be quite good despite the involvement of so many members of the Coalition. One indication of the tight operation security is that many Marines in the Amphibious Task Force did not know until the last minute that an amphibious assault was not going to take place.

CHAPTER III

LESSONS LEARNED

In our examination of the selected deception operations in the previous chapter, several common themes began to appear as to why the three deception operations were successful. This chapter will examine those themes and the lessons learned for the operational commander in conducting deception operations.

Mission. The first theme is that understanding the mission of the basic operation is paramount. The deception operation should exist only to support the main operation; it should have no life of its own. The primary mission of the Amphibious Task Force in Desert Storm was to convince the Iraqis that an amphibious assault was part of the ground attack. CINCCENT resisted the temptation (and lobbying by some Marines) to use these forces in the actual assault, where they were not needed, thus avoiding unnecessary casualties and conserving valuable operational resources.

Know the enemy. Before any successful deception operation can take place, enemy capabilities and intentions, and enemy perceptions of one's own capabilities and intentions should be studied. You can't deceive the enemy unless you have some indication as to what he believes you are going to do and what his capabilities are to either uncover the deception story or to receive and respond to it. In the three cases studied,

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information about the enemies perceptions, intelligence capabilities, and intentions were all well known.

Intelligence. Paramount to knowing the enemy is having good intelligence. In *Fortitude*, the Yom Kippur War, and Desert Storm, the deceivers all had good intelligence about their adversaries. Intelligence is also essential for feedback on how the enemy receives and responds to the deception. Feedback enables modification or abandonment of the plan, as required.

Unity of effort. Unity of effort is critical in keeping the deception and the supported operation in synch and for maintaining operational security. In all three cases examined, the deception operation was understood and approved at the highest levels of the civilian government and the military. Also, in all three cases, joint and combined forces were successfully integrated into the deception operation without compromising operational security.

Timing. Timing of the deception operation in respect to the supported operation is critical. In *Fortitude*, phasing of the real units out of the FUSAG into the actual Normandy invasion and phasing in of fictitious units to replace them had to be carefully phased so as not to tip off the timing of the actual invasion.

Security. Maintaining operational security is paramount in any deception operation. In all three cases, even though the

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enemy received information through the media or other sources about the actual operations, the deception operations themselves never appear to have been compromised. Since they were not compromised, they helped to offset or contradict any leakages regarding the actual operations.

Creativity. Deception is truly an art and not a science. There is no deception template that can be imposed on every deception operation for every operation will have a unique set of circumstances--mission, enemy capabilities, friendly capabilities,etc.--with which to work. Inventiveness rather than standardization enhances deception. In each deception operation studied, the deception tactics used were tailored to the mission and the desired action of the enemy and around the resources at the deceiver's disposal. Each used different methods to sell the deception. In *Fortitude*, the Allies used their strength (double agents) against the German's weaknesses (poor intelligence and Hitler's intransigence). In the Yom Kippur War, the Egyptians wanted to convince the Israelis not to act so they used tactics--frequent mobilizations, exercises, media and diplomacy--that would reinforce Israeli perceptions that the Egyptians were incapable of attacking. In Desert Storm, after the first stage of the air campaign, the Iraqis had almost no technological intelligence capability except for the media. Therefore, military actions that were clearly visible to Iraqi troops, such as diversionary feints or raids, were used along with disinformation fed via the media to the Iraqis.

CHAPTER IV

FEASIBILITY OF DECEPTION OPERATIONS IN THE FUTURE

We have seen how successfully deception was used in the past but what is its utility for the future? Were the cases we examined representative of what the operational commander faces today or will face in the near future and are the lessons learned still valid? To answer these questions almost presupposes that we know what the future holds for the operational commander. When in reality since the Cold War ended, the world has become a much more complicated, less predictable place. What will the future commander face--more Desert Storms or more Yugoslavias and Somalias? If the answer is more major regional contingencies, requiring vast amounts of resources, like Desert Storm, than deception certainly has a role to play. As we have seen, deception by acting as a force multiplier can offset the commanders dwindling resources.

If the answer is more contingencies on the lower end of the spectrum of conflict than deception may or may not be appropriate. Deception has been used very successfully in the past for counterterrorist, counterinsurgency and some peacetime contingency operations. The British used deception as an integral part of their counterinsurgency operations in Malaya and Kenya.[35] In *Just Cause*, the military used a series of exercises prior to the invasion of Panama to convince Noriega that the U.S. was just doing routine training and had no

intention of attacking.[36] In *El Dorado Canyon*, the launch of
the F-111 strike against Libya was covered by a routine USAFE
exercise.[37] It would appear that in any contingency where the
U.S. uses military action to try to gain an advantage over an
adversary's military forces that deception could be a useful and
effective tool. However, in contingencies, such as
peacekeeping, peacemaking or humanitarian assistance, where the
reduction of ambiguous signals and the avoidance of conflict are
the goals, deception operations appear to have less merit.

Another question that might be asked, is whether deception
is still possible in this age of high technology? In Desert
Storm, Iraq despite their deficiencies and the Coalitions great
advantage in high tech sensors was still able to deceive the
Coalition forces. A lesson that will probably not be lost on
the rest of the world. Saddam used diplomatic deception to sen
ambiguous signals about his true intentions towards Kuwait in
order to convince the world that he had no intention of invading
Kuwait even though his troops were massed on the Kuwaiti border.
The Iraqis also used numerous forms of tactical deception--
camouflage, multiple aircraft shelters, dummy equipment and
buildings, smoke, fake damage--to complicate Coalition targeting
and battle damage assessment.[38] The Iraqis used the media to
report fake or exaggerated damage and casualties hoping to
generate world disapproval of the Coalition effort or to garner
world support for their cause.[39]

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One of the most effective deception tools the Iraqis had were their mobile Scuds. They used fake launchers, and either hid, camouflaged, or moved around the actual launchers to confuse the targeteers. The Coalition forces used a vast array of resources to tackle this problem which remained unresolved throughout the war. Although the Scuds posed little or no military threat their use against the Israelis as a political tool threatened to cause the Coalition to unravel.

One reason deception is still possible is that technology is not very useful in determining enemy intentions. The U.S. had technical verification that Iraq's troops were mobilized on the Kuwaiti border but still did not know Saddam's true intent. Satellite reconnaissance, while it would have revealed the "left hook," would not have revealed whether the threatened amphibious assault was real or a deception. The key to making deception work in the future returns us to our lessons learned. One must know the enemy's abilities to either receive or uncover the deception and one must tailor the deception in light of these and one's own capabilities. The challenge for the operational commander is to find ways to use the enemy's intelligence gathering capabilities to enhance rather than defeat the deception. While today's apparent trend towards short-notice, crisis contingencies and high technology warfare certainly provides added challenges for employing deception, it certainly does not negate the utility of the tool or the relevance of the lessons learned.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

Deception has been recognized as a useful tool in conducting warfare for almost twenty-five centuries. Operational commanders have used it in major wars as well as operations short of war to gain an advantage over the enemy. Deception has been particularly effective, throughout history, as a force multiplier. In the three cases--*Fortitude*, the Yom Kippur War and Desert Storm--that we examined in this paper, deception was successfully employed to offset unfavorable or inadequate friendly versus enemy force ratios.

By examining these three cases of deception, we were able to develop several recurring themes or lessons learned for conducting deception operations. These lessons include:

(1) Ensure the deception operation supports the overall mission.

(2) Know enemy capabilities and intentions and his perceptions of your capabilities and intentions.

(3) Know the enemy's intelligence capabilities to receive and defeat the deception while using one's own intelligence capabilities to sell the deception and to provide feedback to modify or abandon the deception, as required.

(4) Unity of effort both vertical--from the highest civilian and military authorities down to the lowest levels--and horizontal--across joint, combined, or other agency lines--is critical to ensure proper execution and security of the operation.

(5) The deception operation must be properly phased with the supported operation to ensure the deception operation is believable and does not compromise the supported operation.

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(6) Maintaining security of the deception operation is critical to its success.

(7) The use of deception is an art and not a science. Deception operations should be tailored to meet the unique circumstances of the mission they support.

These lessons are applicable to all deception operations no matter at what level of conflict or level of technology the contingency takes place.

Deception is no magic elixir that once applied to every operation assures its unqualified success. But, deception can be a very effective way to cause the opponent to misapply or squander his resources while the deceiver husbands or advantageously employs his. Facing a new world order of multiple and diverse threats with declining resources, the operational commander can ill afford to ignore the lessons of past deception successes or the applicability of deception in future operations.

NOTES

1. Sun Tzu, <u>The Art of War</u>, translated by Samuel B. Griffith (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 66.

2. <u>Ibid</u>., p. 98.

3. Michael Dewar, <u>The Art of Deception in Warfare</u> (New York: David and Charles Publishers, 1989), p. 35.

4. For purposes of this paper, operational deception is being defined simply as the use of deception by the operational commander to meet his strategic objectives. For JCS approved definitions of strategic and tactical military deception and a proposed definition of operational deception see: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, <u>Doctrine for Joint Operational Deception</u>, Initial Draft, Joint Pub 3-58 (Washington: 1992), p. GL-5.

5. Dewar, pp. 70-77; and Barry D. Hunt, "An Eyewitness Report of the Fortitude Deception," Donald C. Daniel and Catherine L. Herbig, eds., <u>Strategic Military Deception</u> (New York: Pergamon Press, 1982), p. 225.

6. <u>Ibid</u>., p. 71-72.

7. <u>Ibid</u>., pp. 72-74.

8. Charles Cruickshank, <u>Deception in World War II</u> (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 177-189; and Dewar, pp. 72-73.

9. T. L. Cubbage, "The German Misapprehensions Regarding Overlord: Understanding Failure in the Estimative Process," Michael I. Handel, ed., <u>Strategic and Operational Deception in the Second World War</u> (Totowa, NJ: Frank Cass, 1987), pp. 117-118.

10. Dewar, pp. 69-70.

11. <u>Ibid</u>., p. 70.

12. See Cruickshank, pp. 95, 101, 114-124 for details of Canadian and Russian involvement.

13. Chaim Herzog, <u>The Arab-Israeli Wars</u> (New York: Random House, 1982), p. 315.

14. Chaim Herzog, <u>The War of Atonement</u> (Boston: LIttle, Brown and Company, 1975), p. 32.

15. John Amos, "Deception and the 1973 Middle East War," Donald C. Daniel and Catherine L. Herbig, eds., <u>Strategic Military Deception</u> (New York: Pergamon Press, 1982), pp. 323-325.

16. <u>Ibid</u>., p. 323.

17. Handel, <u>Perception, Deception, and Surprise: The Case of the Yom Kippur War</u> (Jerusalem: Hebrew University Press, 1976), pp. 51, 55.

18. Amos, p. 326.

19. Handel, <u>Perception, Deception, and Surprise: The Case of the Yom Kippur War</u>, p. 59.

20. Amos, pp. 327-328.

21. Herzog, <u>The War of Atonement</u>, p. 38.

22. Herzog, <u>The War of Atonement</u>, p. 39.

23. U.S. Department of Defense, <u>Final Report to Congress: Conduct of the Persian Gulf War</u> (Washington, DC: 1992), p. 96.

24. <u>Ibid</u>., p. 96.

25. <u>Ibid</u>., p. 90.

26. <u>Ibid</u>., p. 102.

27. <u>Ibid</u>., p. 141.

28. Robert C. Parker, Jr., "Deception: The Missing Tool," <u>Marine Corps Gazette</u>, May 1992, p. 100.

29. <u>Ibid</u>., pp. 300-304.

30. Editors of <u>Time Magazine</u>, <u>Desert Storm: The War in the Persian Gulf</u> (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1991), p. 72.

31. Floyd D. Kennedy, Jr., "Deception in the Gulf," <u>National Defense</u>, April 1991, p. 38.

32. Norman Friedman, <u>Desert Victory</u> (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991), p. 130.

33. Tom Post, "To the Shores of Kuwait," <u>Newsweek</u>, February 11, 1991.

34. U.S. Department of Defense, p. 215.

35. For descriptions of the use of deception in these operations see Dewar, p. 183-189.

36. Lorenzo Crowell, "The Anatomy of Just Cause: The Forces Involved, the Adequacy of Intelligence, and Its Success as a Joint Operation," Bruce W. Watson and Peter G. Tsouras, eds., <u>Operation Just Cause: The U.S. Intervention in Panama</u> (Boulder: Westview Press, Inc., 1991), p. 80.

37. David C. Martin and John Walcott, <u>Best Laid Plans: The Inside Story of America's War against Terrorism</u> (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1988), p. 297.

38. For a more detailed description of Iraqi deception schemes see: Editors of <u>Time Magazine</u>, pp. 49, 56-58, and 77.

39. <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 56.

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